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paolo manganelli* 
The Evolution of the Italian and U.S. Bankruptcy 
Systems—A Comparative Analysis 
introduction 
Until the late 20th century, italian bankruptcy law remained primarily a 
punitive system, designed to punish a delinquent debtor rather than facilitate its 
rehabilitation or reorganization. However, the widely publicized failure of several 
Italian corporations, such as the collapse of the Parmalat Group and the insolvency 
of national air carrier Alitalia, highlighted the shortcomings of the Italian 
bankruptcy laws in dealing with such large corporate bankruptcies, and a 
subsequent push for reform occurred.1 Despite certain reforms, the Italian 
bankruptcy system is not yet an integrated system and remains largely piecemeal 
without a centralized “bankruptcy code” like the United States’ system. 
This Article provides a comparative analysis of the Italian and U.S. bankruptcy 
systems and provides recommendations for additional reform of the Italian 
bankruptcy system based on the U.S. experience. Part I sets forth a general 
introduction to the legal framework of the Italian bankruptcy system along with an 
overview of its recent reform. Part II provides a general introduction to the legal 
framework of the U.S. bankruptcy system, and Part III offers a comparative analysis 
of the Italian and U.S. bankruptcy systems and analyzes the U.S. bankruptcy laws 
that the Italian bankruptcy system should adopt based on the U.S. experience. 

© 2010 Paolo Manganelli. 
 *  Paolo Manganelli is a senior associate in the Corporate practice of the Milan office of Paul, Hastings, 
Janofsky & Walker LLP and is currently seconded to the Paul Hastings’ New York office. He focuses his practice 
on corporate, insolvency, and restructuring matters. Prior to joining Paul Hastings, from 2004 through 2006, 
Mr. Manganelli worked as the Parmalat Group’s deputy head of litigation, advising on all litigation matters 
arising from Parmalat’s insolvency and financial fraud, as well as on legal matters relating to the Parmalat 
restructuring plan. Before joining the Parmalat Group, Mr. Manganelli was in-house counsel of the Fiat Group, 
where he was actively involved in a number of corporate transactions in the automotive and service sectors and 
also worked on mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, and commercial agreements. Mr. Manganelli 
graduated from the University of Torino, Italy, in 2000 and has been a member of the Torino bar since 2003. 
 1. See Michael Gavridis & Nicola Ficarella, Enron and Parmalat 39 (2004) (unpublished B.A. dissertation, 
European School of Economics) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=886921) (describing Parmalat as the first 
Italian corporate crash that had an international effect); see also Antonio Azzarà & Paolo Manganelli, Italy—The 
Marzano Law: A Special Procedure for Large Insolvent Companies, Analysis of the Amendments Brought by the 
Alitalia Case, STAY CURRENT, Jan. 2009, http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1134.pdf?wt.mc_ID 
=1134.pdf (discussing the insolvency of Alitalia).  
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i. general introduction to the legal framework of the italian 
bankruptcy system and its evolution 
A. The Origin of the Italian Bankruptcy System 
The origins of modern Italian bankruptcy law date back to 1942, when the Royal 
Decree No. 267 of March 16, 1942 (“Royal Decree”)2 first introduced the legal 
framework of the modern Italian bankruptcy system. This legal framework survived 
substantially unchanged for most of the 20th century, and only over the last decade 
has it been revised and amended to better suit the needs of a significantly changed 
Italian economic and industrial environment. 
The Royal Decree was premised on a very old concept of bankruptcy, aptly 
characterized by the word used to describe the bankruptcy proceedings conducted 
thereunder, “Fallimento,” or “failure.”3 The Royal Decree ascribed to bankruptcy a 
substantially negative social value; an entrepreneur who failed to succeed in 
business was considered as a social threat. Rather than offering fair and efficient 
remedies to the troubled entrepreneur for the reorganization of his business, the 
Royal Decree was enacted primarily as a tool for punishment, aimed at the 
liquidation of the distressed enterprise.4 In many instances, the bankrupt debtor was 
even subject to (i) restriction of certain rights (e.g., voting rights, ability to assume 
certain managing roles within governmental entities, and to participate in certain 
professions), and (ii) criminal sanctions and liabilities.5 This anachronistic concept 
of bankruptcy survived until 2006, when the structure of the Royal Decree was 
substantially reformed and amended. 

 2. Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law: A Comparison of the Recent Bankruptcy 
Acts of Italy and the United States, 31 MINN. L. REV. 401, 401 n.1 (1947); see also Codice Della Legge 
Fallimentare, http://www.ilcaso.it/fallimenti/indice-lf.php (providing, in Italian, the various versions of the 
Royal Decree before and after the Reform). 
 3. See Anuradha Sen, French, German, Dutch and Italian Insolvency Laws—A Glance 4 (Dec. 22, 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=953258) (listing the insolvency procedures 
available in Italy). 
 4. See Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor—and a Modest Proposal to Return to the 
Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 810 (1983) (discussing the purpose of early Italian bankruptcy 
laws as not for the debtor’s relief, “who was treated as an outlaw,” but for the remedy of his creditors).   
 5. Id.; Paolo Di Martino, Approaching Disaster: Personal Bankruptcy Legislation in Italy and England, c. 
1880–1939, 47 BUS. HISTORY 23, 27–29 (2005); see also Codice Della Legge Fallimentare, Pubblico Registro dei 
Falliti (Aborgato), http://www.ilcaso.it/fallimenti/lfa50.php (providing, in Italian, the former version of Article 
50 of the Royal Decree). 
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B. The Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceedings (Fallimento)6 
The Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceedings, or Fallimento, set forth in the Royal Decree 
are essentially liquidation proceedings. To access the Ordinary Bankruptcy 
Proceedings, a debtor must be insolvent and meet certain dimensional 
requirements in terms of number of employees, revenues, and outstanding debt.7 
Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceedings are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Italian bankruptcy courts.8 
The petition for bankruptcy may be filed by the debtor itself (voluntary 
bankruptcy) or filed by the creditors of the debtor or by the public prosecutors 
(involuntary bankruptcy).9 After the filing of a bankruptcy petition, a debtor loses 
control over its assets (an Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceeding is a “debtor-not-in-
possession” proceeding), and a bankruptcy court-appointed receiver administers 
the proceeding under the supervision of the bankruptcy court.10 
A creditors’ committee, generally consisting of three to five creditors, is then 
appointed by the bankruptcy court.11 The creditor’s committee is an active 
constituent in the Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceeding, and a receiver must consult 
with such committee during the proceeding. The creditor’s committee may also 
issue recommendations on certain aspects of the Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceeding. 
The overall proceeding, however, is primarily administered by the receiver who, 
among other things: (i) prepares the inventory of the debtor’s assets; (ii) forms the 
list of creditors according to their respective priorities; (iii) assumes or rejects 
executory contracts; (iv) initiates any necessary lawsuits (e.g., claw-back actions and 
damage actions against former directors and auditors); (v) informs the public 
prosecutors of any potential criminal liability related to the bankruptcy; and, (vi) 
drafts the liquidation plan, liquidates the assets, and repays creditors in accordance 
with their respective priorities.12 
An Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceeding terminates13 with the distribution to the 
creditors of the proceeds derived from liquidated bankruptcy estate assets and 

 6. See Alexander Klauser, Appointed Insolvency Officers, Austria, Germany, Italy, 30 INT’L BUS. LAW. 241, 
256 (2002) (defining the bankruptcy proceeding of Fallimento); see also SIDO BONFATTI & PAOLO F. CENSONI, 
MANUALE DI DIRITTO FALLIMENTARE (2d ed. 2007); PAOLO DEMARCHI, FALLIMENTO E ALTRE PROCEDURE 
CONCORSUALI (2009); GIUSEPPE FAUCEGLIA & LUCIANO PANZANI, FALLIMENTO E ALTRE PROCEDURE CONCOR-
SUALI (2009); LINO GUGLIELMUCCI, DIRITTO FALLIMENTARE (2008); PIERO PAJARDI, CODICE DEL FALLIMENTO 
(2009). 
 7. See Riesenfeld, supra note 2, at 414. 
 8. Id. at 404. 
 9. Id. at 414. Before the reforms of the Royal Decree, Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceedings could also be 
commenced upon a court’s spontaneous initiative. See id. 
 10. Id. at 417. 
 11. Id. at 405; see also infra Part I.F.5.iv (regarding the new powers of the creditors’ committee).  
 12. Riesenfeld, supra note 2, at 405 (discussing the curatore’s, or receiver’s, role in representing creditors). 
 13. See id. at 428 (describing the sale of the debtor’s assets); see also Daniela Andreatta, Buy-Out of Bank-
ruptcy Estates Under Italian Bankruptcy Law, BLOOMBERG L. REP.–BANKR. L., 2009, http://www.orrick.com/ 
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proceeds from any legal actions, according to the order of priority imposed by law, 
summarized below: 
(i) secured claims (e.g., claims secured by a pledge or mortgage); 
(ii) administrative claims (e.g., claims due for the management of the 
bankruptcy and the continuation of the enterprise); 
(iii) priority claims (e.g., claims for salaries, social security contributions 
and taxes); 
(iv) unsecured claims; and, 
(v) subordinated claims (e.g., equity and certain intercompany loans).14 
In addition to the receiver-conducted liquidation proceeding described above, 
there is an alternative and more efficient (in terms of costs and timing) method to 
conclude an Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceeding, recently amended by the Reform:15 
the filing of a “Concordato Fallimentare.”16 The Concordato Fallimentare is a post-
petition filing of a composition (similar to a plan of liquidation) that is subject to 
creditors’ vote. 
A Concordato Fallimentare may be proposed at any time by any party-in-interest, 
except for the debtor and its affiliates, who can only propose it one year after the 
commencement of the Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceeding.17 The Royal Decree does 
not provide any guidance with respect to the content of a Concordato Fallimentare; 
thus, a Concordato Fallimentare may encompass any kind of transaction to 
effectuate the liquidation of a debtor (e.g., debt-equity swap, sale of assets, business 
assignments).18 A Concordato Fallimentare must be accepted by (i) the creditors 
holding the majority of the allowed claims and (ii) the majority in each class of 
allowed claims.19 A non-vote is deemed an accepting vote.20 Once accepted, the 

fileupload/2257.pdf (discussing the liquidation of a bankruptcy estate); Legge Fallimentare—Testo a Fronte, 
http://www.ilcaso.it/fallimenti/lfa118.php (providing, in Italian, the text of Article 118, which describes the 
closure of a bankruptcy proceeding). 
 14. The priority claims order is set forth in Article 111 of the Royal Decree. Legge Fallimentare—Testo a 
Fronte, http://www.ilcaso.it/fallimenti/lfa111.php (providing, in Italian, Article 111). See generally P.G. 
Monateri, Italian Insolvency Law, http://www.jus.unitn.it/cardozo/Review/Business/Insol.html#7 (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2010) (listing the priority of creditors’ claims pursuant to the Italian Civil Code and sections of the 
Insolvency Act of 1942).  
 15. See infra Part I.F. 
 16. See Riesenfeld, supra note 2, at 409 (discussing the difference between Concordato Fallimentare and 
Concordato Preventivo in the Italian Bankruptcy Act of 1942); see also Codice Della Legge Fallimentare, 
http://www.ilcaso.it/fallimenti/indice-lf.php (providing, in Italian, Articles 126–41, which describe the closing 
of a Concordato Fallimentare). 
 17. Before the reform brought by Legislative Decree No. 5 of January 9, 2006, the Concordato Fallimentare 
could be proposed by the debtor only, and no other parties were allowed to make any proposals.  
 18. See Riesenfeld, supra note 2, at 451 (“All unsecured creditors with allowed claims are entitled to 
participate.”).  
 19. See id. (“Assent of a majority in number of the qualified creditors representing two-thirds in amount of 
such claims is required.”).  
 20. See generally JONES DAY, COMPARISON OF CHAPTER 11 OF THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY CODE WITH 
THE SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE RESCUE PROCEDURE IN FRANCE, INSOLVENCY 
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Concordato Fallimentare is binding against all non-accepting creditors (cram-
down).21 
C. Special Liquidation Procedure for Financial Institution and Insurance Companies—
Compulsory Administrative Liquidation 
In addition to the Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceeding, the Royal Decree also provides 
for a special liquidation procedure, the Compulsory Administrative Liquidation, 
which applies to any entities that, due to the nature of the activity they perform, are 
subject to the control of the Italian public administrations (e.g., banks, insurance 
companies, sports companies).22 In addition to the Royal Decree, a Compulsory 
Administrative Liquidation is subject to any other applicable laws that govern such 
entities. For instance, the liquidation of insolvent banks and other financial 
institutions are governed by a specific section of Legislative Decree No. 385 of 
September 1, 1993.23 
D. Extraordinary Administration 
1. History of the Extraordinary Administration24 
Reform of the existing Italian bankruptcy system first occurred in the late seventies, 
when the Prodi Law25 was enacted to govern the insolvency of large corporations. 
The Prodi Law introduced a special procedure called Extraordinary Administration, 
primarily aimed at protecting employment and preserving a distressed company’s 
assets through the continuation, re-establishment, or conversion of its business.26 

PROCEEDINGS IN GERMANY, AND EXTRAORDINARY ADMINISTRATION FOR LARGE INSOLVENT COMPANIES IN ITALY 
49–61 (2007), http://www.jonesday.com/ (search for “Comparison of Chapter 11 Code with Italy”; then follow 
“Comparison of Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code with” hyperlink) [hereinafter COMPARISON] 
(discussing creditors’ votes to approve a composition). 
 21. See Andreatta, supra note 13 (discussing the bankruptcy court’s authority to validate a buy-out 
proposal in spite of dissenting creditors). 
 22. See Klauser, supra note 6, at 256 (defining the bankruptcy proceeding of liquidazione coatta 
amministrativa as “a compulsory administrative liquidation proceeding”). 
 23. See generally Vincenzo Sinisi, Second Banking Directive and Italian Legislation, 24 INT’L BUS. LAW. 538, 
538 (1996) (describing Legislative Decree No. 385 as repealing and substituting the Second Banking Directive).   
 24. See Sen, supra note 3, at 4 (listing extraordinary liquidation as one of the insolvency-related 
proceedings available in Italy); see also CONCETTO COSTA, L’AMMINISTRAZIONE STRAORDINARIA DELLE GRANDI 
IMPRESE IN STATO DI INSOLVENZA DOPO IL D.LGS. 12.9.2007, N. 169 (2008); MARIANNA GALIOTO, 
L’AMMINISTRAZIONE STRAORDINARIA DELLE GRANDI IMPRESE IN STATO DI INSOLVENZA (2003); LUCA PONTI & 
FRANCESCA SPADETTO, L’AMMINISTRAZIONE STRAORDINARIA DELLE GRANDI IMPRESE IN CRISI (2006). 
 25. See Monica Marcucci, The Inefficiency of Current Italian Insolvency Legislation and the Prospects of a 
Reform, in BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION IN BELGIUM, ITALY & THE NETHERLANDS 47, 49 (2001) (describing the 
Prodi law as the reform of the Italian law on the special administration of large enterprises and discussing the 
shortcomings of the previous procedure created by Law No. 95).  
 26. In practice, however, Extraordinary Administration under the Prodi Law and Prodi-bis Law failed for 
various technical reasons and usually resulted in liquidation procedures. See Riccardo Brogi & Paolo Santella, 
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After its enactment, the Prodi Law passed the scrutiny of the Italian Supreme 
Court, the Constitutional Court,27 and the European Court of Justice, whose 
decision28 led the Italian legislature to replace the Prodi Law with the Prodi-bis 
Law,29 which provided a revised version of Extraordinary Administration still in 
force today.30 
A few years later, in the last days of 2003, Italy was the scene of the largest 
European case of financial fraud in history: the collapse of the Parmalat group.31 
Since none of the legal restructuring instruments then in force was deemed 
adequate to successfully tackle such an unprecedented and complex bankruptcy, the 
Italian government enacted a further “special” Extraordinary Administration 
procedure for very large corporations, the Marzano Law.32 
The Marzano Law was the starting point for the wider reform of the Italian 
bankruptcy system. For the first time, a bankruptcy proceeding was designed to 
encourage the recovery of a debtor-company through composition agreements 
between the debtor and its creditors. The Marzano Law was enacted, at least in 
principle, to preserve the continuation of the debtor’s business and to prevent a 
liquidation of the debtor’s business, and it represented a significant break with a 
historically punitive Italian bankruptcy system.33 
Subsequently, from time to time, the Marzano Law has been further amended in 
order to meet the specific needs of the distressed company involved. The most 
significant amendment was the Alitalia Decree, enacted by the Italian government 
to tackle the insolvency of the national air carrier Alitalia.34 

Two New Measures of Bankruptcy Efficiency 13 (Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 1, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=426961 (discussing the failure of the Prodi law). 
 27. See COMPARISON, supra note 20, at 50 (discussing the introduction of Extraordinary Administration by 
the Italian government). 
 28. European Court of Justice Decision 96/434/CE, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Notice.do? 
mode=dbl&lang=en&ihmlang=en&lng1=en,fr&lng2=da,de,el,en,es,fi,fr,it,nl,pt,sv,&val=344001:cs&page (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2010).  
 29. See Azzarà & Manganelli, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing Legislative Decree No. 270 of July 8, 1999). 
 30. The Prodi-bis Law applies to companies that have (i) debts equal to two-thirds of both the assets and 
the ordinary gross profits shown in a company’s last fiscal year financial statement; and (ii) more than 200 
employees in the last fiscal year. COMPARISON, supra note 20, at 50 (discussing the application of the Prodis-bis 
Law to companies). 
 31. Gavridis & Ficarella, supra note 1, at 39 (“Parmalat was . . . the seventh largest food company in the 
world . . . . Now its name will be remembered in economic textbooks for being amongst the biggest European 
corporate frauds ever.”). 
 32. See Azzarà & Manganelli, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing the application of the Marzano law). The 
Marzano law applies to companies that have: (i) debts of at least   300 million and (ii) at least 500 employees in 
the last fiscal year. Id. 
 33. Antonio Auricchio, Debt Restructuring Agreements in Italy Under the Recent Law No 80/2005, 
INSOLVENCY, RESTRUCTURING & CREDITORS’ RTS. (Int’l Bar Ass’n Legal Practice Div.), Sept., 2005, at 29, 30. 
 34. See Azzarà & Manganelli, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing various amendments to the Marzano Law in the 
wake of Alitalia’s insolvency). The amendment was enacted by Legislative Decree No. 134, which was converted 
into Law No. 166. Id. 
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2. Extraordinary Administration—The Procedures35 
Similar to Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceedings, the Extraordinary Administration is a 
debtor not-in-possession proceeding. The bankruptcy petition, however, can only 
be filed by an insolvent company meeting the specific requirements provided either 
by Prodi-bis Law or by the Marzano Law. 
Once a company, and its affiliates, is declared insolvent and is admitted into 
Extraordinary Administration, one or more extraordinary commissioners are 
appointed by the Ministry of Economic Development (“Ministry”) to administer 
the proceeding and manage the company’s business under the supervision of a 
designated judge and the Ministry (Extraordinary Administration is both a judicial 
and administrative proceeding).36 Certain Royal Decree provisions apply as default 
provisions to Extraordinary Administrations, unless otherwise stated.37 The 
extraordinary commissioners have the same powers and duties as receivers in 
bankruptcy proceedings.38 
In an Extraordinary Administration, the extraordinary commissioner must file a 
reorganization plan to be implemented either through a financial restructuring or 
an assets sale.39 The extraordinary commissioner may also propose a composition 
(similar to a plan of reorganization) with creditors (“Concordato”).40 
The most notable and progressive feature of the Marzano Law is in its new 
Concordato procedure. For the first time, creditors are divided into classes, subject 
to different treatments and to cram-down.41 The Concordato may expressly con-
template, among other things, mergers, business assignments, debt-equity swap 
transactions, and issuance of securities for the reorganization of the debtor 
business. The Concordato must be accepted by creditors representing the majority 
of allowed claims and, if different classes of creditors exist, by vote of creditors 
representing the majority of allowed claims in each class.42 This instrument has been 
successfully used and modeled upon the Parmalat case for the first time. 

 35. See generally COSTA, supra note 24; GALIOTO, supra note 24; PONTI & SPADETTO, supra note 24; 
FAUCEGLIA & PANZANI, supra note 6.  
 36. See Azzarà & Manganelli, supra note 1, at 1–2 (discussing the role of the Ministry of Economic 
Development). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Vincenzo Cariello, The “Compensation” of Damages with Advantages Deriving from Management 
and Co-ordination Activity (Direzione e Coordinamento) of the Parent Company (Article 2497, Paragraph 1, 
Italian Civil Code), 3 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 330, 331 (2006) (“In the event of bankruptcy, compulsory 
liquidation or extraordinary administration of a managed and co-ordinated company, action is undertaken on 
behalf of the creditors either by the receiver, the liquidator, or the extraordinary commissioner.”). 
 39. Azzarà & Manganelli, supra note 1, at 2. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Auricchio, supra note 33, at 30. 
 42. COMPARISON, supra note 20, at 56. 
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E. Directors’ Liabilities in Bankruptcy43 
The declaration of bankruptcy (as well as admission to Extraordinary 
Administration) triggers the application of the criminal provisions contained in the 
Royal Decree. The directors of a company that has been declared bankrupt may be 
(i) held liable for damages caused to the company by their wrongdoing, and (ii) 
may also be held criminally liable for transactions executed while the company was 
in the insolvency zone (i.e., when a debtor is unable to repay its debts and perform 
its obligations when due).44 
The directors of a bankrupt company may be held criminally liable if it is shown 
that they committed a “simple bankruptcy crime”45 (e.g., execution of high-risk 
transactions during the pre-insolvency period; deepening insolvency either by not 
filing for insolvency proceedings or by other grossly negligent actions; failure to 
correctly maintain corporate books and records) or a “fraudulent bankruptcy 
crime”46 (e.g., hiding, destroying, or dissimulating the assets of the company to 
prejudice the creditors; destroying or falsifying corporate books and records; 
making payments or declaring non-existing securities to favor certain creditors and 
prejudice others). It is also a bankruptcy crime to seek recourse to, or continue 
recourse to, credit facilities with the effect of hiding the insolvency.47 It should be 
noted, however, that the above-mentioned bankruptcy-related crimes can only be 
prosecuted if a declaration of bankruptcy has occurred. 

 43. See generally Maurizio Pontani, Pre-Bankruptcy Crimes and Entrepreneurial Behavior. Some Insights 
from American and Italian Bankruptcy Laws (German Working Papers in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 
14, 2004), available at http://www.bepress.com/gwp (discussing the criminal liability of directors in the context 
of bankruptcy). See also LA RESPONSABILITÀ DI AMMINISTRATORI, SINDACI E REVISORI CONTABILI (Stefano 
Ambrosini ed., 2007). 
 44. See Pontani, supra note 43, at 2 (noting the criminal liability of directors and entrepreneurs for 
wrongful conduct committed prior to bankruptcy). 
 45. See id. at 21 (discussing the simple bankruptcy crime, bancarotta semplice, pursuant to Article 217); 
Legge Fallimentare—Testo a Fronte, http://www.ilcaso.it/fallimenti/lfa217.php (providing, in Italian, the text of 
Article 217); Legge Fallimentare—Testo a Fronte, http://www.ilcaso.it/fallimenti/lfa224.php (providing, in 
Italian, the text of Article 224, which applies the penalties described in Article 217 to directors and CEOs of 
bankrupt companies). 
 46. See Pontani, supra note 43, at 21 (discussing the fraudulent bankruptcy crime, bancarotta fraudolenta, 
pursuant to Article 216); Legge Fallimentare—Testo a Fronte, http://www.ilcaso.it/fallimenti/lfa216.php 
(providing, in Italian, the text of Article 216).  
 47. See Legge Fallimentare—Testo a Fronte, http://www.ilcaso.it/fallimenti/lfa225.php (providing, in 
Italian, the text of Article 225); http://www.ilcaso.it/fallimenti/lfa226.php (providing, in Italian, the text of 
Article 226). See generally Pontani, supra note 43, at 21 (discussing the criminal sanctions that result from 
having made an insolvency worse). 
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F. The Reform of the Italian Bankruptcy System48 
The movement for systematic reform of the Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceedings 
began in the early nineties, but for various reasons such efforts failed.49 Only in 
2005, was the Royal Decree finally amended.50 
The Marzano Law accelerated the reform of the Ordinary Bankruptcy 
Proceedings because the inadequacy of the latter was amplified by the contrasting 
more modern provisions of the Marzano Law. Unfortunately, however, reform of 
the Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceedings was not as systematic as expected. Three 
different waves of reforms occurred from 2005 to 2007. The first reform amended 
only certain provisions regarding claw-back actions and the “Concordato 
Preventivo” (preliminary composition with creditors).51 The second, significantly 
broader reform amended several parts of the Royal Decree, but it contained many 
inconsistencies, which resulted in numerous opposite constructions and threatened 
the efficiency of the system.52 Accordingly, a few months later, a new law, the 
Legislative Decree No. 169 of September 12, 2007, was enacted in order to correct 
and refine the previous reforms.53 
1. The Drivers of the Reform and Its Key Features 
The essential aim of the above-mentioned reforms (collectively, the “Reform”) was 
to update and improve the efficiency of an antiquated Italian bankruptcy system 
and to make the Italian distressed market more appealing for potential domestic 
and international investors. 
Particularly, the Reform transitioned the Italian bankruptcy system from a 
punitive system to a system that acknowledges that business failure is an inevitable 
part of the modern capitalist system; a modern bankruptcy system should provide 

 48. See Daniela Andreatta, Restructuring Proceedings Under Section 182bis of the Italian Bankruptcy Law, 
BLOOMBERG L. REP.— BANKR. L., 2009, http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/2307.pdf (discussing the recent 
reform of Italian Bankruptcy law). See generally SIDO BONFATTI & PAOLO FELICE CENSONI, 3 LE DISPOSIZIONI 
CORRETTIVE ED INTEGRATIVE DELLA RIFORMA DELLA LEGGE FALLIMENTARE (2d ed. 2008); FALLIMENTO E ALTRE 
PROCEDURE CONCORSUALI, supra note 6; LA RIFORMA DELLA LEGGE FALLIMENTARE PROFILI DELLA NUOVA 
DISCIPLINA (S. Ambrosini ed., 2006); Luciano Panzani, The Italian Bankruptcy Law Reform—Act III, in NORTON 
ANNUAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY 301 (Bruce Leonard ed., 2009), available at 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/?task=finish&cid=1820&catid=572.  
 49. Cf. Michele Vietti, Modernizing Italy’s Bankruptcy Law, SMART LESSONS IN ADVISORY SERVICES (Int’l Fin. 
Corp.), Dec. 2007, at 1, http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/SmartLessons/DB_Italy_Bankruptcy.pdf 
(describing some of the difficulties in the early 2000s in reforming the Italian bankruptcy system and the 
momentum gained after the failure of Parmalat). 
 50. Azzarà & Manganelli, supra note 1, at 3.  
 51. See Andreatta, supra note 48 (discussing the new bankruptcy law’s exclusion of claw-backs and Decree 
No. 35). 
 52. See id. (discussing Legislative Decree No. 5 of Jan. 9, 2006). 
 53. See Vietti, supra note 49, at 4 (discussing the enactment of Legislative Decree No. 169 of Sept. 12, 
2007). 
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the tools for preservation of a debtor’s assets and the successful reorganization of a 
debtor’s business for the interests of all parties in interest.54 The following sub-
sections address the major changes brought by the Reform. 
2. Out-of-Court Restructuring Pursuant to Article 67 of the Royal Decree 
The Reform introduced certain out-of-court procedures for debt restructuring. 
Article 67(3)(d) of the Royal Decree (“Article 67”) was enacted to protect 
transactions carried out by a company for the restructuring of its debt. Article 67 
promotes out-of-court settlements and agreements with creditors, thus avoiding 
costly insolvency proceedings.55 
Pursuant to Article 67, transactions, payments, and issuances of securities with 
respect to a company’s assets are not subject to claw-back actions (in case of 
subsequent bankruptcy) if they are carried out in compliance with a plan of 
reorganization approved by an independent expert (appointed by the company).56 
Article 67, however, does not protect a company from any other action, such as 
bankruptcy petitions or other claims that creditors or other parties in interest may 
file. Generally, an agreement is reached between a company and its financial 
creditors only. Employees and trade creditors are usually paid in full. In addition, 
given that Article 67 entails private settlements, there are no priority claims 
imposed by law. 
Since its introduction, Article 67 has been frequently utilized and preferred over 
other restructuring procedures brought by the Reform due to the absence of court 
scrutiny and because the reorganization can be kept confidential (only listed 
companies are required to disclose details of reorganization).57 
3. Court-Approved Restructuring Pursuant to Article 182bis of the Royal Decree 
Article 182bis of the Royal Decree (Article 182bis) was enacted to promote the 
restructuring of a company. Under Article 182bis—similar to a prepackaged plan or 
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code58—a 

 54. See generally Andreatta, supra note 48 (discussing the benefits debtors received as a result of the 
Reform). The Reform was inspired by bankruptcy systems of foreign countries and particularly the Chapter 11 
proceedings of the United States Bankruptcy Code. See Simona Di Sano, A New Anti-bankruptcy Tool—The 
New Italian Debt Restructuring Arrangements Rules, 2007 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 387, 389 (discussing 
similarities between the Italian law and the United States Bankruptcy Code). 
 55. Di Sano, supra note 54, at 388. 
 56. See id. at 389 (discussing immunity to claw-backs under Articles 67 and 182). 
 57. See Enrica Maria Ghia, How to ‘Turnaround’ in Italy, ABI INT’L COMMITTEE NEWSL. (Am. Bankr. Inst., 
Alexandria, Va.), Oct. 2009, at 21, 22, available at http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/ 
international/vol6num6/italy.pdf. 
 58. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–74 (2006); see Di Sano, supra note 54, at 389 (discussing the similarities between 
Article 182bis and the United States Bankruptcy Code). In the Italian bankruptcy system, the debtor has limited 
powers, which are only exercised by receivers in Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceedings and the extraordinary 
commissioners in Extraordinary Administrations. See supra Part I.B. 
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company proposes, negotiates, and executes an out-of-court plan of reorganization 
with its creditors holding no less than 60% of claims.59 Once a company has reached 
agreement with its creditors, the plan is filed with the Companies’ Register, 
published in the relevant Register, and filed with the bankruptcy court. Along with 
the restructuring agreement, the company must also file with the bankruptcy court 
a report drafted by an independent expert (appointed by the company) that certifies 
the feasibility of the agreement and its adequacy with respect to ensuring the regular 
payment of the creditors who are not party thereto.60 
In practice, Article 182bis is generally used by a company that has a small 
number of creditors holding a significant portion of its debt; the small number of 
creditors makes it possible to conduct negotiations with each creditor. Article 
182bis does not determine the content of such a plan, but it does require that such 
plan ensures payment of the creditors who are not party thereto.61 Similar to Article 
67, given the private nature of Article 182bis, there are no priority claims imposed 
by law. 
As with Article 67, Article 182bis prevents claw-back actions against the 
transactions carried out in pursuance of an approved plan.62 In addition, Article 
182bis shields a company from any other action, such as creditors’ foreclosure 
actions or other third-party claims, for as long as 60 days from the date of the filing 
of the approved plan in the Companies’ Register.63 
After the filing, a court examines the proposed plan, rules upon any challenges 
filed by any parties in interest, and, if acceptable, approves the plan. Afterwards, the 
debtor in possession files the approved plan in the Companies’ Register. 
Article 182bis was initially seldomly utilized but this procedure has recently 
become more popular.64 It is very likely that the recourse to Article 182bis will 
increase. 

 59. See generally Di Sano, supra note 54, at 389 (discussing the restructuring plan as privately negotiated 
between creditors and debtors). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 391–92 (articulating that creditors who did not sign the restricting agreement still must be 
paid under their original claims). 
 62. Id. at 389.  
 63. See id. (noting the requirement of registration with the Companies’ Register). 
 64. Andreatta, supra note 48 (noting that 182bis proceedings became “pretty popular” in complex 
restructurings in 2009). For example, when Risanamento S.p.A., an Italian real estate company, was preparing 
and finalizing its restructuring plan under Article 182bis, public prosecutors filed an involuntary petition for 
bankruptcy for the company with the aim of pursuing certain alleged bankruptcy-related crimes. Milan 
Prosecutor Seeks Risanamento Bankruptcy, REUTERS, July 16, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
idUSLG41249320090716. Risanamento S.p.A. finalized and filed the Article 182bis before the date of the first 
court hearing on the legitimacy of the involuntary bankruptcy petition. See Giuseppe De Palma et al., The 
Italian Job: Milan Court’s Restructuring Brings Real Estate Group Within “The Self-Preservation Society”, ASS’N OF 
CORP. COUNSEL, Nov. 30, 2009, http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d8ae9973-1b21-447d-aa71-
8c1e70fc22d1. At the hearing, the court held that the filing of Article 182bis does not prevent and/or stop, per se, 
an involuntary bankruptcy petition, but, at the same time, held that parties must await the outcome of the 
MANGANELLI.PP4.DOC 6/14/2010  4:31 PM 
 The Evolution of the Italian and U.S. Bankruptcy SystemS 
248 journal of business & technology law 
4. The New “Concordato Preventivo” 
Concordato Preventivo, or “preliminary composition with creditors,” is a court-
supervised proceeding that contains similar attributes to a Chapter 11 case under 
the United States Bankruptcy Code.65 Concordato Preventivo is normally used by 
companies where Article 67 and Article 182bis would not be applicable or effective. 
Concordato Preventivo consists of a court-approved restructuring proposal that, if 
accepted by the creditors holding the majority of the debt, binds all creditors 
(including creditors who have not accepted it). This is a procedure that is 
supervised by a court (any transaction outside of ordinary course of business, any 
major settlement, and any payment of any pre-petition claim needs the court’s 
prior authorization), which examines the proposal accompanied by the opinion of 
an expert and evaluates whether the proposal and the restructuring plan are 
feasible.66 
If the court finds that the plan and the proposal are not feasible or not properly 
drafted and reliable, it may reject the proposal or refuse to approve the Concordato 
Preventivo even if the creditors accepted the proposal.67 In these cases, it is highly 
likely that the company will be declared bankrupt. 
Creditors may be divided into different classes on the basis of similar economic 
interests, and a company may differentiate the economic treatment for each class. 
The classification of creditors into different classes, however, cannot alter the 
priority treatment of creditors set by law.68 The court is charged with ensuring the 
legality of class classification. 
Secured creditors do not vote unless the proposal contemplates a partial 
payment of the secured liabilities they are owed. In such circumstances, they are 
allowed to vote for the portion of such liabilities that will not be paid. In addition, it 
is also possible to propose a settlement of taxes due to the tax authority.69 
Where different classes of creditors exist, a court may approve the arrangement 
notwithstanding that the majority in one or more classes of creditors has not voted 

Article 182bis before proceeding with an involuntary bankruptcy. Id. Accordingly, the court favored, de facto, 
Article 182bis over Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceedings. See id. 
 65. See Sen, supra note 3, at 4 (listing Concordato Preventivo as one of the insolvency-related procedures 
available in Italy). With Concordato Preventivo, like Article 67 and Article 182bis, the company does not 
commence a bankruptcy proceeding and does not have the powers granted to a debtor, such as avoidance 
powers, right to assume or reject executory contracts, etc., which are fundamental rights granted to debtors 
under the United States Bankruptcy Code. Cf. Giorgio Cherubino, The Reform of the Italian Insolvency Law, 
EXECUTIVEVIEW.COM, Feb. 1, 2008, http://executiveview.com/knowledge_centre.php?id=1889 (noting that the 
debtor is not considered bankrupt in a Concordato Preventivo). 
 66. Di Sano, supra note 54, at 389.  
 67. See id. (discussing the Bankruptcy Court’s authority to check feasibility requirements). 
 68. See id. at 391–92 (specifying that creditors who were not parties to the debt restructuring agreement are 
still entitled to their claims). 
 69. Legge Fallimentare, http://www.ilcaso.it/fallimenti/lfa182ter.php (providing, in Italian, the text of 
Article 182ter). 
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to accept the plan, provided that the majority of the classes vote to accept the plan 
and the court finds that the dissenting creditors will receive an amount not less than 
the amount they would receive under “any other practicable alternative.”70 Once 
approved by the requested majority and ratified by the court, the plan becomes 
binding on all creditors (cram-down).71 
5. Amendments to Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceedings 
In addition to the above-mentioned proceedings, the Reform also amended the 
Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceedings to address the changed Italian economic system, 
abandoning the former concept of bankruptcy as a punitive measure. It is 
important to mention the following amendments: 
(i) Access to Bankruptcy Proceedings: The threshold for being eligible for 
bankruptcy has been raised;72 
(ii) Personal Inabilities: The personal inabilities following a bankruptcy 
declaration have been abolished;73 
(iii) Claw-back Actions: The statutory period for claw-back actions has been 
reduced and now ranges from six months (for regular transactions) to 
one year (for irregular or fraudulent transactions). Moreover, certain 
transactions are now exempt from claw-back actions (e.g., payments, 
guarantees, and security made or granted in the context of a 
restructuring program under Article 67, Article 182bis, or Concordato 
Preventivo);74 
(iv) Creditors’ Committee: The role of the creditors’ committee has been 
considerably strengthened. The creditors’ committee not only has the 
duty to supervise the activity of the receiver, but it also has the power to 
request replacement of the receiver, authorize certain transactions, and 
provide binding opinions;75 and 

 70. See COMPARISON, supra note 20, at 56–57 (discussing the bankruptcy court’s power to bind a 
composition over the protests of dissenting creditors).   
 71. Id. 
 72. Legge Fallimentare, http://www.ilcaso.it/fallimenti/lfa1.php (providing, in Italian, the text of Article 1). 
Small business debtors, in order to be exempted from bankruptcy proceedings, must demonstrate the 
concurrence of: (i) a value of assets in the past three fiscal years not exceeding   300,000; (ii) gross incomes not 
exceeding   200,000 for each of the previous three fiscal years; and (iii) outstanding debts, if not yet due, not 
exceeding   500,000. Id. 
 73. Legge Fallimentare, http://www.ilcaso.it/fallimenti/lfa142.php (providing, in Italian, the text of Article 
142, which discharges liability for indebted companies for individuals who have cooperated in a bankruptcy 
proceeding); see also Panzani, supra note 48, at 309. 
 74. Stefano Crosio & Gherardo Cadore, Recent Amendments to Italian Bankruptcy Law, METROPOLITAN 
CORP. COUNS., Oct. 1, 2005, http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view&artMonth= 
October&artYear=2005&EntryNo=3677. Before the Reform, the “suspect period” varied from one year to two 
years depending on the type of transaction and the way it was executed. Id. 
 75. See Andreatta, supra note 13 (describing the authority of the creditors’ committee to provide binding 
opinions). 
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(v) Concordato Fallimentare: As mentioned previously, the Concordato 
Fallimentare has been modernized and could now be proposed by any 
party-in-interest.76 
G. Criticism of the Reform77 
The Reform significantly modernized the Italian bankruptcy system. However, 
some adjustments and amendments are still needed. The major Reform criticisms, 
in particular, are summarized in the following subsections. 
1. Lack of Coordination with Bankruptcy Criminal Provisions 
The lack of coordination between the new reorganization procedures introduced by 
the Reform and the bankruptcy criminal provisions represents one of the major 
issues of the new bankruptcy system. Although the Reform considerably amended 
the existing bankruptcy proceedings and introduced new reorganization 
procedures, at the same time it did not bring any change to the criminal bankruptcy 
provisions contained in the Royal Decree.78 This lack of coordination currently 
represents an obstacle to the widespread utilization of the new reorganization 
procedures since the transactions executed pursuant to Article 67 or Article 182bis 
do not protect a debtor from any possible bankruptcy-related criminal liability in 
case of subsequent bankruptcy (such as, among others, the preferential payments to 
selected creditors to the detriment of other creditors under Article 216 of the Royal 
Decree). 
Arguably the risk of criminal liability is lower if a transaction was carried out in 
furtherance of one of the above-mentioned reorganization procedures. However, it 
would be prudent to reconcile such procedures with the Royal Decree’s criminal 
provisions in order to ensure that directors, managers, and other professionals are 
exempt from such liabilities to encourage the adoption of such procedures. 
2. Lack of Coordination Between New Reorganization Procedures and Ordinary 
Bankruptcy Proceedings 
Another shortcoming of the Reform is that an unsuccessful restructuring pursuant 
to a reorganization procedure will be followed by an Ordinary Bankruptcy 
Proceeding, without any continuity or any protections for the actions taken 
pursuant to a reorganization procedure. For example, there are no provisions in the 
Royal Decree that ensure that there is priority given to any new financing made 
available to the debtor in the course of an Article 67 or Article 182bis procedure, in 

 76. See id. (describing the Reform’s effect of granting accessibility to third parties); see also supra Part I.B. 
 77. See Di Sano, supra note 54, at 390 (discussing criticism of the Reform); see also Panzani, supra note 48, 
at 326–27. 
 78. See Pontani, supra note 43, at 1, 22 (discussing criminal consequences in Italian bankruptcy law).  
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addition to the costs and expenses incurred by the professionals that assist the 
debtor with its reorganization.79 This is an issue that must be addressed because it is 
a deterrent both for lenders to extend credit to the insolvent debtor and 
professionals to assist the distressed debtor. 
Any unsecured new financing provided to the debtor pursuant to Article 67 or 
Article 182bis procedures is treated as an unsecured claim in a subsequent 
bankruptcy. Similarly, any fees incurred by professionals who assist the debtors in 
reorganization would be treated as unsecured claims in case of subsequent 
bankruptcy. 
Furthermore, under Article 67, Article 182bis, and Concordato Preventivo, a 
debtor does not have the remedies and powers that are available to the receivers in 
Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceedings and the extraordinary commissioners in the 
Extraordinary Administration (particularly, the right to assume or reject executory 
contracts and unexpired lease agreements), which would better help the debtor to 
have a fresh financial and operations start. 
3. Lack of Coordination with Extraordinary Administration 
The Reform amended only the Royal Decree, and no reference is made to the 
Extraordinary Administration.80 To achieve general reform and simplification of the 
Italian bankruptcy system, the existing Extraordinary Administration should be 
aligned with the new provisions of the Royal Decree brought about by the Reform. 
Moreover, the Extraordinary Administration does not contemplate the 
possibility of being carried out by the debtor itself as debtor in possession. A 
reorganization process managed by the debtor under the supervision of a court and 
the Ministry—absent any fraud or gross negligence—would certainly be more 
efficient, given that a debtor in possession has a better knowledge of its business 
operations. The extraordinary commissioners, in fact, generally do not have 
knowledge of a debtor’s business and spend the first months just getting 
familiarized with the company’s structure, which has a significant impact on the 
continuation of the company’s business. 
H. Outlook 
Today, the various disjointed reforms of the Italian bankruptcy system, as outlined 
above, have resulted in a confusing system. There are at least four different 
insolvency proceedings: (i) the Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceedings; (ii) the 

 79. Cf. Codice Della Legge Fallimentare, http://www.ilcaso.it/fallimenti/indice-lf.php (providing, in Italian, 
the text of the Royal Decree, which does not include provisions for debtor financing or professional fees 
incurred while the bankruptcy procedure is occurring). 
 80. Giorgio Corno, Recent Reforms Concerning Italian Insolvency Law: An Overview (with Specific 
Regard to Voidable Transactions) (unpublished manuscript, available at www.laworld.com/attachments/035_ 
Italian_insolvency_law_reforms.doc). 
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Extraordinary Administration for large corporations (Prodi-bis Law); (iii) the 
Extraordinary Administration for very large corporations (Marzano Law); and, (iv) 
the Extraordinary Administration for very large corporations offering public 
services (Alitalia Law). 
The Italian legislature must (i) simplify and unify the sprawling legal framework 
for insolvency proceedings and (ii) reform the criminal provisions of the Royal 
Decree in light of the recently introduced reorganization procedures. 
 
 
ii. general introduction to the legal framework of the u.s. bankruptcy 
system and its evolution 
A. The U.S. Bankruptcy System 
Bankruptcies in the United States are governed by title 11 of the United States Code 
(the “Bankruptcy Code”). The Bankruptcy Code embodies the fundamental 
concept that an honest debtor deserves a fresh financial start.81 Since its enactment, 
the Bankruptcy Code has been amended several times, but the most extensive 
amendments occurred in 2005, with the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (the “2005 Bankruptcy Act”).82 The Federal Rules 
of Bankruptcy Procedure and the local rules of each district govern bankruptcy 
procedure.83  
For the purpose of this Article, the following chapters of the Bankruptcy Code 
need to be mentioned: Chapter 7, which is a court-supervised liquidation 
proceeding (similar to Italian Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceedings), Chapter 11, 
which is a debtor-in-possession proceeding for the reorganization of commercial 
enterprises and repayment of creditors through a court-approved plan of 
reorganization, and Chapter 15, which provides the rules for cross-border 
insolvency proceedings. This Article will generally focus on analysis of Chapter 11 




 81. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy 
act is to ‘relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh 
free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.’” (quoting Williams v. 
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915))). 
 82. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. 
 83. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1001 provides that “[t]he Bankruptcy Rules and Forms govern 
procedure in cases under title 11 of the United States Code.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001. District courts may enact 
local rules consistent with the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9029(a). 
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B. General Introduction to Chapter 11 
Chapter 11 is a court-supervised proceeding that allows companies to reorganize 
financially and operationally. Chapter 11 is primarily designed to preserve the 
“going-concern value” of business and allow a debtor to continue its business while 
restructuring its debt and/or operations.84 However, banks, other financial 
institutions, insurance companies, and stockbrokers are not eligible to file for 
Chapter 11 and are usually liquidated through other federal or state wind-up laws.85 
In Chapter 11, a debtor remains as a debtor in possession and continues to 
manage its own business in the ordinary course, provided that, among other things, 
any transaction made outside of the ordinary course of business, any major 
settlement, or any payment on a pre-petition claim must be approved by the 
bankruptcy court.86 A trustee is generally not appointed. The appointment of a 
trustee is limited to a very small number of cases and only upon the occurrence of 
certain circumstances (usually mismanagement or fraud).87 
From the commencement of the bankruptcy case, and subject to certain 
limitations, the debtor is entitled to the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code. The automatic stay provides a “breathing spell” for the debtor and provides 
for the stay of all judgments, collection activities, foreclosures, and repossession of 
property.88 
At the beginning of a bankruptcy case, a debtor in possession will file certain 
“first day” motions with the bankruptcy court in order to continue its business in 
the ordinary course (e.g., continue payment of employee wages and benefits, 
continuation of customer programs, payment to critical vendors, and continuance 
of existing cash management systems).89 In addition, a debtor in possession can 

 84. See Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 34 
ARIZ. L. REV. 89, 92 (1992) (“On the assumption that keeping the assets intact will preserve ‘going concern 
value,’ Chapter 11 provides for a continuation of the business operations and a financial restructuring rather 
than a liquidation.”). 
 85. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2006). Insurance companies, banks, and other financial institutions do not qualify as 
debtors under Chapter 7, and therefore do not qualify as debtors under Chapter 11. §§ 109(b), (d). Section 
109(d) also excludes stockbrokers from participation in Chapter 11. § 109(d). 
 86. § 363 (allowing trustees to operate debtor’s business in the ordinary course without notice and 
hearing); see also §§ 1107–08 (assigning a debtor in possession all rights and duties of a trustee, with certain 
exceptions). 
 87. § 1104 (providing for appointment of trustee in cases of “fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross 
mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current management”); see also In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 109 
B.R. 755, 765 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (“The appointment of a trustee in a Chapter 11 case is an extraordinary 
remedy.”). 
 88. 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
 89. In re The Colad Group, Inc., 324 B.R. 208, 212 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005) (“In bankruptcy practice, the 
phrase ‘first day motions’ refers generally to any of a variety of requests made shortly after the filing of a 
Chapter 11 petition, for prompt authorizations needed to facilitate the operation of the debtor’s business.”); see 
also § 105(a) (giving bankruptcy courts authority to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title”). 
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request the bankruptcy court to authorize debtor-in-possession financing to pay for 
its financing needs during its bankruptcy case. Debtor-in-possession financing is 
generally protected by priority liens on the debtor’s assets, and, in any case, 
unsecured debtor-in-possession financing benefits from super-priority claim 
status.90 The court may even authorize the debtor to grant super-priority liens on 
already encumbered properties so long as a court deems that the interests of 
existing lien holders are “adequately protected.” Such provisions ensure that lenders 
are willing to lend to a debtor in bankruptcy. 
The Bankruptcy Code also contains “Safe Harbor Provisions” that exempt the 
post-petition exercise of certain financial instruments from the automatic stay.91 For 
example, a swap participant or financial participant (master netting agreements, 
swap agreements, and master agreements) is allowed to set-off, net, and execute 
certain contractual rights of termination under swap agreements.92 In addition, for 
these types of agreements, section 560 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a non-
defaulting counterparty to enforce ipso facto clauses (e.g., clauses that render 
insolvency or bankruptcy as termination; such clauses are generally not enforceable 
in bankruptcy).93 The underlying reason for such Safe Harbor Provisions is to 
ensure the liquidity of the financial markets in the event of a bankruptcy of a major 
financial institution.94 
C. The Plan of Reorganization 
A debtor in possession in Chapter 11 ultimately seeks to confirm a plan of 
reorganization (the “Plan”), which commonly involves the reduction of the overall 
amount of debt along with the reorganization of business operations. Generally, 
once the debtor in possession has obtained first-day relief and stabilized its 
operations, the debtor in possession prepares, discusses, and negotiates the Plan 
with its creditors. 
A Plan can only be proposed by a debtor during the “Exclusivity Period,” which 
the 2005 Bankruptcy Act fixed as 120 days after the filing.95 Only upon termination 
of the Exclusivity Period are other parties in interest allowed to file alternate Plans.96 

 90. § 364. 
 91. See § 362(b); Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why 
the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 95–96 (2005). 
 92. § 362(b)(17), (o); see also § 560 (defining contractual rights of swap participants and financial 
participants). 
 93. § 560; see also § 365(e)(1); Bryan G. Faubus, Note, Narrowing the Bankruptcy Safe Harbor for 
Derivatives to Combat Systemic Risk, 59 DUKE L.J. 801, 824–25 (2010). 
 94. 128 CONG. REC. 15,981 (1982) (statement of Sen. Dole) (“It is essential that stockbrokers and securities 
clearing agencies be protected from the issuance of a court or administrative agency order which would stay the 
prompt liquidation of an insolvent’s positions, because market fluctuations in the securities markets create an 
inordinate risk . . . .”); see Shmuel Vasser, Derivatives in Bankruptcy, 60 BUS. LAW. 1507, 1509–10 (2005). 
 95. § 1121(b). This exclusivity period can be extended up to 18 months in most cases, and up to 300 days 
in small business cases, upon court permission. §§ 1121(d)(2)(A), 1121(e). 
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In connection with the Plan, the debtor in possession is also required to file a 
disclosure statement with the bankruptcy court. The disclosure statement must 
contain “adequate information” that would enable a hypothetical reasonable 
investor and the typical holder of claims or interests of the relevant class to make an 
informed judgment about the Plan.97 
After court approval of a disclosure statement, creditors are solicited to vote on 
the Plan. If creditors have been divided into separate voting classes, each class must 
accept the Plan by a majority of “two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in 
number of the allowed claims” in each class.98 Claims that are not impaired are not 
required to vote. Where there are impaired classes of claims, the Plan can only be 
confirmed by the court if it has been accepted by at least one class of impaired 
claims.99 The confirmation of a Plan is subject to court approval at a confirmation 
hearing. 
 
D. The Prepackaged Plan of Reorganization 
The Bankruptcy Code also allows the potential debtor to adopt a special mechanism 
to rapidly emerge from Chapter 11 and minimize the impact of a bankruptcy. This 
mechanism is called a prepackaged plan of reorganization (the “Prepackaged 
Plan”).100 
In a Prepackaged Plan, a potential debtor proposes, negotiates, and solicits votes 
on a reorganization plan before the filing of a Chapter 11 petition. When the debtor 
files its bankruptcy petition, the reorganization plan has already been accepted by 
the necessary parties. The role of the bankruptcy court is limited to ensuring that all 
necessary confirmation requirements were met and to confirming such a 
Prepackaged Plan.101 
The Prepackaged Plan is generally suitable for those debtors who have a smaller 
number of creditors that are usually sophisticated financial or institutional 

 96. § 1121(c).  
 97. § 1125. 
 98. § 1126(c). 
 99. § 1129(a)(10); see § 1124 (defining impaired class). 
 100. See Marc S. Kirschner et al., Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans: The Deleveraging Tool of the ‘90s in the Wake 
of OID and Tax Concerns, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 643, 661–62 (1991) (describing a pre-packaged Chapter 11 
procedure). 
 101. §§ 1128–29; see § 1123 (listing required contents of Prepackaged Plan). The Prepackaged Plan should 
not be confused with the pre-negotiated plan of reorganization: in the latter case, the debtor reaches a general 
agreement with creditors regarding the most material terms and conditions of the reorganization plan before 
filing of the Chapter 11 petition. See Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy 
Implications of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 739–41 (2008). The solicitation of the 
votes in connection with the proposed plan takes place after the bankruptcy filing. Id. 
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creditors.102 Such counterparties are usually used to dealing with such issues and 
generally are interested in a successful reorganization of a debtor. In addition, such 
counterparties usually retain claims that remain relatively constant and do not 
fluctuate in the period preceding the filing. 
A Prepackaged Plan is still subject to confirmation requirements as with an 
ordinary plan (e.g., disclosure statement, limitations, etc.),103 in addition to certain 
specific requirements. Pursuant to the recently amended section 1125(g) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, a debtor may also continue to solicit votes on his Prepackaged 
Plan after a bankruptcy petition (involuntary) is filed, based on the pre-petition 
disclosure statement.104 This provision offers the debtor protection against those 
creditors who aim to stop the reorganization process by filing involuntary 
bankruptcy petitions during the period in which the debtor is soliciting votes on his 
Prepackaged Plan. 
 
iii. a comparative analysis of the italian and u.s. bankruptcy systems 
A. Preliminary Considerations 
As stated in the Introduction, the Italian bankruptcy system was originally 
structured to punish debtors. Such an approach to insolvency has changed only 
recently pursuant to the Reform, and the various constituents of the Italian 
bankruptcy system (i.e., courts, advisors, professionals, etc.) still lack experience 
with the various new restructuring tools provided by the Reform. 
By contrast, the modern U.S. bankruptcy system was enacted under opposite 
principles: to provide debtors with a fresh start, to encourage the successful 
reorganization of the business, and to protect the value of the enterprise for the 
benefit of all stakeholders.105  
In the following sections, I will focus on the differences between the above-
described bankruptcy systems and provide recommendations as to the continued 
reform of the Italian bankruptcy system. 
 

 102. See John D. Ayer et al., Out-of-Court Workouts, Prepacks and Pre-Arranged Cases: A Primer, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., Apr. 2005, at 16, 56 (explaining that prepackaged plans are most successful in cases with a small 
number of creditors and “fairly concentrated” debt). 
 103. See supra Part II.C. 
 104. § 1125(g) (“Notwithstanding subsection (b), an acceptance or rejection of the plan may be solicited 
from a holder of a claim or interest if such solicitation complies with applicable nonbankruptcy law and if such 
holder was solicited before the commencement of the case in a manner complying with applicable 
nonbankruptcy law.”). 
 105. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 565 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (noting the Bankruptcy Code’s “strong public policy in favor of maximizing debtors’ estates and 
facilitating successful reorganization”). 
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B. Restructuring and Reorganization Process in the Two Systems 
In the United States, the vast majority of distressed corporations are reorganized 
through Chapter 11.106 In Italy, most of the insolvent large corporations were in the 
past liquidated through Extraordinary Administration or the Ordinary Bankruptcy 
Proceedings.107 Only after the enactment of the Marzano Law and the Reform did 
distressed corporations begin to adopt the newly introduced reorganization tools 
described above. The main differences between the Italian and U.S. legal systems for 
corporate restructuring are summarized below. 
1. Out-of-Court Restructuring 
As mentioned above, the reorganization and restructuring process in the United 
States is usually carried out with Chapter 11 and is, therefore, an in-court process.108 
The Bankruptcy Code does not provide for any specific statutory protection or 
acknowledgment of an out-of-court restructuring (with the sole exception for the 
pre-petition activities in the Prepackaged Plan).109 
 On the other hand, Article 67 of the recent reform of the Italian bankruptcy 
system introduced a specific out-of-court restructuring procedure, which is allowed 
to benefit from certain protections in case of subsequent bankruptcy.110 
2. Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Professional Fees 
One of the key elements for successful restructuring is debtor-in-possession 
financing that allows a debtor to obtain credit to continue its operations during 
bankruptcy. Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor in possession to 
obtain new financing upon court authorization, and such financing usually receives 

 106. In the fiscal year ending March 31, 2009, within the business filings, Chapter 11 cases rose 69.1 percent, 
to 11,785, compared to the 6,971 Chapter 11 filings in the same time period in 2008. Compare U.S. Bankruptcy 
Courts––Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the 12-
Month Period Ending Mar. 31, 2009, http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/statistics.htm (follow “2009 by 
Chapter” hyperlink under “12-Month Period Ending March” heading) (last visited Feb. 17, 2010), with U.S. 
Bankruptcy Courts––Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, 
During the 12-Month Period Ending Mar. 31, 2008, http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/statistics.htm 
(follow “2008 by Chapter” hyperlink under “12-Month Period Ending March” heading) (last visited Feb. 17, 
2010). 
 107. See COMPARISON, supra note 20, at 50. 
 108. See supra Part II.B; note 106 and accompanying text. 
 109. See In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014, 1015–19 (Bankr. D. Utah. 1982) (discussing the Bankruptcy 
Code’s policy in favor of out-of-court restructuring as implicitly reflected in 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1) (2006)). 
 110. See Di Sano, supra note 54, at 388. 
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priority claims on a debtor’s assets, allowing debtors to access credit where lenders 
would not otherwise lend to a bankrupt company.111 
 In Italy, obtaining such financing is more complex. As mentioned above, the 
new restructuring procedures primarily entail private negotiations between a debtor 
and its creditors.112 The courts have a limited involvement in the process, mostly 
aimed at verifying compliance with the bankruptcy laws. The Royal Decree does not 
grant priority claim status to debtor-in-possession financing during restructuring 
procedures, discussed in Part I.B. above. 
 Therefore, if the restructuring procedures fail and subsequent Ordinary 
Bankruptcy Proceedings are commenced, there are two possible outcomes: (1) if the 
restructuring was carried out through Article 67 or Article 182bis, in the case of 
subsequent bankruptcy, the lender to a debtor in possession would not benefit from 
any super-priority claim; or (2) if the debtor chose the Concordato Preventivo, only 
debtor-in-possession loans that have been approved by the court during the 
procedure are eligible for super-priority claims (“prededucibili”). 
 In both systems the debtor-in-possession lenders are entitled to priority in 
distribution if debtor-in-possession loans are approved by a court order. The 
difference, however, is that two of the three Italian reorganization procedures do 
not foresee that kind of court involvement, and, therefore, the debtor-in-possession 
lenders may not benefit from the priority claim status in the case of unsuccessful 
reorganization and subsequent bankruptcy.113 
 
3. Automatic Stay 
As soon as a debtor files a petition for Chapter 11, it becomes eligible to benefit 
from the automatic stay provisions provided for under the Bankruptcy Code. In 
Italy, it depends on the type of proceeding: Article 67 does not provide an 
automatic stay; Article 182bis only provides a limited period of automatic stay (60 
days after the publication of the agreement); and the Concordato Preventivo 






 111. 11 U.S.C. § 364; see § 507(b) (discussing priority of financing obtained under § 364). 
 112. See supra Part I.F. 
 113. See COMPARISON, supra note 20, at 60 (noting that Extraordinary Administration allows for priority 
claims for lenders providing new money). Debtor-in-possession financing granted in the course of Ordinary 
Bankruptcy Proceedings or Extraordinary Administration is approved by the court and, as such, is eligible for 
the super-priority claim status. Id. 
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4. Debtor-in-Possession Procedures 
Reorganization under Chapter 11 is normally a debtor-in-possession procedure, 
unless fraud or mismanagement has been committed. In Italy, whilst the three new 
reorganization tools introduced by the Reform (i.e., Article 67, Article 182bis, and 
Concodato Preventivo) are debtor-in-possession procedures, the reorganization of 
large corporations under the Extraordinary Administration may be pursued only 
through a debtor-not-in-possession procedure. 
5. Court Scrutiny and Risk of Conversion 
While a U.S. bankruptcy court is very involved in a Chapter 11 proceeding, the role 
of Italian courts in the restructuring proceedings is more limited. Article 67 does 
not provide for any court involvement; Article 182bis provides for limited court 
involvement; in the Concordato Preventivo, the role of the court is broader.114 
 Court scrutiny may represent a guarantee for certain creditors, but at the same 
time it diminishes the control of the debtor on the overall process and increases the 
risk of conversion or dismissal of the case. 
 In addition, debtors may fear that the courts will find irregularities in the 
management of the companies or attempt prosecuting illegal transactions and 
bankruptcy-related crimes. This is why in Italy, after the Reform, debtors tried to 
pursue business and financial reorganizations through Article 67, which does not 
provide any court involvement.115 
6. Reorganization Plan Proponents 
Article 67, Article 182bis, and Concordato Preventivo may only be proposed by the 
debtor. In the United States, instead, once the exclusivity period has expired, the 
Plan under Chapter 11 may by proposed by any party-in-interest. To this regard, 
one may affirm that, while the Italian procedures introduced new tools under the 
control of the debtor only, the U.S. legislators extended the benefits of, and the 
initiative to, third parties and creditors especially. 
7. Summary Table 
Below I report a table summarizing the key features of the reorganization 




 114. See Di Sano, supra note 54, at 388. Despite the Reform attempting to limit the discretionary powers of 
the courts in Concordato Preventivo procedures, in recent case law the same courts somehow tried to regain the 
scrutiny powers they formerly had for such procedures. Id. 
 115. See id. at 389–90 (discussing debtors’ reluctance to use judicial bankruptcy proceedings). 
MANGANELLI.PP4.DOC 6/14/2010  4:31 PM 
 The Evolution of the Italian and U.S. Bankruptcy SystemS 














under Marzano Law 
Debtor in Possession 
X X X X  
Impact on Business 
X 
 
 X X 
Automatic Stay 
X  60 days X X 




 X X 
Protection of Transactions 
from Claw-Back Actions 
X X X X X 
Court Involvement 
X  Partial X X 





Risk of Losing Control and 
Conversion 
X   X X 
 
Fishbowl Syndrome 
X  Limited X X 
C. What Should the Italian Lawmaker Learn from the U.S. Experience? 
The Italian government is currently studying a further reform of the bankruptcy 
system in order to simplify the various procedures and improve the functionality 
and efficiency of the new reorganization procedures introduced by the Reform. 
 To this extent, the comparison between the Italian and U.S. bankruptcy systems 
I have provided herein identifies various U.S. Bankruptcy Code provisions that the 
Italian lawmakers should consider importing into the Italian bankruptcy legal 
framework through further reform. Particularly, the following improvements are 
recommended.  
1. Protection of Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Professional Fees 
Parties involved in the reorganization procedures provided for under the Royal 
Decree need to be protected in case of subsequent conversion into Ordinary 
Bankruptcy Proceedings. At least for the procedure under Article 182bis, which 
provides for court involvement, there should be a provision in the Royal Decree 
that, similar to Chapter 11 proceedings, grants to debtor-in-possession lenders and 
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restructuring professionals priority status with respect to their claims. This would 
encourage lenders to finance, and professionals to assist, distressed debtors. 
2. Automatic Stay 
The automatic stay provisions provided for under the Article 182bis procedure 
should be widened in order to give to the debtor the necessary “breathing spell” 
(the 60-day moratorium may be too short), which is provided for in U.S. 
Bankruptcy law. 
3. Safe Harbor Provisions 
Provisions similar to the “Safe Harbor Provisions” provided for under Chapter 11 
for swap and other financial agreements should be replicated in the Extraordinary 
Administration procedures to ensure the liquidity of financial markets in the event 
of a major financial institution’s insolvency.116 
4. Debtor in Possession in the Extraordinary Administration 
The Extraordinary Administration procedures should introduce the ability for a 
debtor to manage its own reorganization as debtor in possession, similar to Chapter 
11 proceedings. This would enhance the efficiency of business reorganization, 
minimize the impact on debtor’s operations, and enhance value for all creditors and 
other parties in interest. 
5. Reorganization Plan Proposals in the Concordato Preventivo 
Creditors and other parties in interest should be allowed, after a designated 
exclusivity period, an opportunity to present a plan for reorganization within a 
Concordato Preventivo procedure, and even the power to file the debtor company 
into Concordato Preventivo. This would grant stronger leverage to creditors and 
potential investors and widen the opportunity for reorganization, and it would 
significantly reduce the recourse to inefficient Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceedings. 

 116. Actually, in the Italian legislation, certain provisions indirectly concerning the treatment of swap and 
other financial agreements in case of bankruptcy are contained in non-bankruptcy laws, namely the rules for 
financial institutions (Legislative Decree No. 58 of Feb. 24, 1998), and the Legislative Decree No. 170 of March 
21, 2004, which received the EU directive No. 47 of June 6, 2002. It would be recommendable, however, that 
specific rules for these types of agreements are contained in the bankruptcy laws. See Andrea Rozzi & 
Ferdinando Bruno, La Collateralizzazione Degli Strumenti Finanziari Derivati OTC (“Over the Counter”) alla 
Luce del D.lgs. 170/2004: Cenni Storici e Problemi Irrisolti, 2007, http://www.ilcaso.it/opinioni/108-rozzi-bruno-
01-07-08.pdf.  
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6. Prosecution of Negotiations on the Reorganization Plan in Case of Conversion into 
Ordinary Bankruptcy Proceedings 
A provision similar to section 1125(g) of the Bankruptcy Code117 should be included 
in the Royal Decree. Particularly, at least for the Article 182bis procedure, it should 
be stated in the law that, in instances of conversion of the case into Ordinary 
Bankruptcy Proceedings due to involuntary filing, the debtor should be allowed, 
within a certain period of time, to carry on the negotiations upon the 
reorganization plan and its implementation, avoiding a liquidation scenario. This 
would discourage creditors and other parties in interest from jeopardizing the 
debtor’s attempt to reorganize his operations by filing involuntary petitions for 
bankruptcy. 
conclusion 
Although the recent Reform of the Italian bankruptcy system118 is largely laudable 
because it gave rise to a broad renovation process and created the basis for a more 
competitive system capable of attracting both domestic and foreign investors, still a 
lot of work needs to be done by the Italian lawmakers. Besides, a further reform of 
the Italian bankruptcy system will undoubtedly be accompanied by a trial period 
where professionals, creditors, courts, and investors will likely be reluctant to adapt 
to new legislation and will probably try to interpret the new laws based on their 
former and old knowledge of bankruptcy. In other words, what we need in Italy is 
not only a change in the law, but also a change of the mind and approach of the 




 117. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(g) (2006); see supra Part II.D. 
 118. See supra Part I.F. 
